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Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in  
Contrast to a Racial Explanation 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita * 
Abstract: »Leopold II. und die Selectorate-Theorie: Eine 
Untersuchung in Abgrenzung zu rassismusbasierten Erklä-
rungsansätzen«. From 1885 until 1908 Leopold II was not 
only the King of Belgium but also the personal owner of the 
Congo Free State. The policy outcomes during his reign 
turned out to be fundamentally different in the two coun-
tries: Whereas in Belgium he improved living conditions, in 
the Congo he established a brutal tyranny. This paper analy-
ses the reasons for these different leadership styles of Leo-
pold II by means of the ‘selectorate theory’. The selectorate 
theory explains policy outcomes as a function of govern-
ance institutions. It assumes that the ruler maximizes his 
own utility which means first of all to sustain himself in 
power. Under Belgium’s governmental institutions Leopold 
II required broad support from the general public but in the 
Congo he only needed a very small group of supporters. To 
reduce the possibility that Leopold’s different leadership 
styles were caused mainly by racism his period is compared 
to the reign of the Congolese leader Mobutu Sese Seko. 
1. Introduction 
Only rarely does history provide a nearly-perfect natural experiment for testing 
a set of deductively derived propositions. The experiences of Belgium and the 
Congo, especially during the reign of Leopold II, provide such a natural ex-
periment. I investigate the structure of governance and the nature of policy 
outcomes under Leopold both in Belgium and in the Congo Free State and 
contrast these with the contemporary record in the Congo/Zaire. In each case I 
                                                             
*  Address all communications to: Bruce Bueno Mesquita, NYU Department of Politics, 19 
W. 4th Street, New York 10012, USA; e-mail: bruce.buenodemesquita@nyu.edu; URL: 
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seek out evidence for or against expectations derived from the selectorate the-
ory of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). 
Leopold II was the King of Belgium from 1865 until his death in 1909 and 
he was the personal owner of the Congo Free State from 1885 until he was 
compelled to relinquish control by world opinion and the Belgian parliament in 
1908. Leopold is a member of a tiny group consisting of people who led more 
than one country. He did so simultaneously, while others, such as Chiang Kai-
Shek (20 years in China and 25 in Taiwan) or Boris Yeltsin (albeit briefly in 
the Soviet Union and then for a more extended time in Russia) did so sequen-
tially. This club provides a controlled setting in which to investigate the role 
institutions play in shaping the behavior of leaders. In each case, factors of 
culture, religion, language, ethnicity, and so forth are held constant. In  
Leopold’s case even personal history is held constant because he ruled both 
countries at the same time. This makes his experiences ideal for purposes of 
illustrating the importance of political-selection institutions in shaping policy 
incentives. As we will see, in one country he was a revered leader and in the 
other he was, to put it mildly, a despot. In each country his actions were consis-
tent with institutionally-induced conditional patterns of behavior predicted by 
the selectorate theory. 
In the process of exploring how governance institutions constrain policy de-
cisions, we also have an opportunity to explore lessons from history to help 
separate the effects of racism from those of institutions. By providing an ac-
count of the Congo’s governance under Leopold and, more recently, under 
Mobutu Sese Seko, we may uncover a means to help clarify some broader 
issues regarding variations in the quality of life in different African countries. 
We will see that governance institutions are strategically chosen by leaders 
whenever the opportunity presents itself. They select how to govern with an 
eye to improving their own opportunity to retain power and to maximize their 
personal well-being. Under some institutional arrangements, especially democ-
ratic ones, we will see that the incumbent’s welfare is intimately tied to the 
well-being of his or her subjects. In more autocratic regimes the opposite is 
true. In those settings, for reasons explained below, bad policy is often good 
politics for the leadership.  
We will see that while racism may have played a part in structuring the in-
stitutions inherited by African leaders at independence, those leaders frequently 
changed the institutions of governance for their own purposes even when those 
purposes ran counter to the interests of their subjects. And we will see that the 
institutions chosen by a colonial ruler like Leopold equally seem to have been 
designed to satisfy their interests whether they were motivated by racism or 
not. That is, colonialists chose optimally and most of their successors after 
independence also chose optimally to enhance their own survival in office and 
the fruits of power whether they were racists or not. As such, I contend that 
reliance on racism or colonial paternalism is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
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explain Africa’s problems. That is not to deny that racism or paternalism were 
elements in choices about seizing and governing colonies, but rather to say that 
other factors are more important in shaping Africa’s present and it’s relatively 
recent past. 
In the next section I provide a non-technical summary of a game theoretic 
model of governance and the core results from that perspective.1 Those inter-
ested in probing the logic and broader evidence regarding this theory should 
consult Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) as well as subsequent journal articles. 
Here there is only space to provide an overview of the theory and its implica-
tions for rulers like Mobutu or Leopold. 
The analytic approach derived from the selectorate theory helps inform my 
examination of the historical record by identifying general propositions that 
guide the investigation of Leopold’s governance in the two distinct settings in 
which he had the opportunity to influence the choice of institutions and shape 
policy. Having established the hypotheses, I then turn to an examination of 
Leopold’s actions and policies and contrast them with the actions and policies 
followed by the Congo’s leaders after the Congo – later Zaire – secured its 
independence from Belgium. We will see that the governance institutions cho-
sen by Mobutu Sese Seko were not terribly different from those selected for the 
Congo Free State by Leopold. We will also see that Zaire’s institutions of gov-
ernance were quite different from those in place at the time of independence 
when Patrice Lumumba became the Congo’s first democratically elected 
leader, with institutional arrangements at that time that were not so different 
from those used then and now to govern Belgium. And we will see that the 
consequences of governance and of political longevity in office were quite 
similar under Leopold and under Mobutu. As Mobutu shared the race of his 
subjects, and the tribal affiliation of many of them as well, and Leopold did 
not, we will see evidence that racial variation does little to help account for the 
similarities in governance approaches, barbarity, kleptocracy, or general public 
policy at least in the cases of the Congo/Zaire and Belgium. 
2. Selectorate Theory of Governance 
In The Logic of Political Survival, Bueno de Mesquita et al. set out a theory in 
which a politician’s motivation to gain and retain power and the institutional 
context in which that politician operates powerfully influence the content of 
political debate and the allocation of resources among contending policy 
                                                             
1  For a full account of relevant parts of this theory, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair 
Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. Cam-
bridge (2003). For extensions of the theory to endogenous institution change, see Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith. “Political Survival, Revolution, and Economic Pro-
ductivity,” Working Paper, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University. 
 206
choices. As argued in that study, the governmental structure of each polity is 
defined by its location in a two-dimensional institutional space. One dimension, 
the size of the selectorate, reflects the number of people in a polity who have a 
say in choosing leaders and, more importantly, have some chance of gaining 
access to the special privileges that every leader and every regime doles out to 
members of its winning coalition. The other dimension, the winning coalition, 
is the subset of the selectorate whose support is essential if a leader is to remain 
in office. Coalition members, depending on the coalition’s size, gain more or 
fewer private benefits and give or withhold loyalty to the incumbent leader. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, democratic national governments are character-
ized by large selectorates and relatively large winning coalitions. Yet, democ-
racies are not all alike in these two characteristics. There are, for instance, 
systematic differences in the size of the winning coalition in different types of 
democracies just as there are across a comparison of any pair of states. For 
example, systems with directly-elected presidents (which is not the case in the 
United States) foster larger winning coalitions than do British-style parliamen-
tary democracies. These, in turn, rely on larger coalitions than many propor-
tional representation systems.  
Autocracies and other non-democratic systems sometimes have smaller se-
lectorates, and always have smaller winning coalitions than democracies do. 
Military juntas and monarchies normally rely both on small selectorates and 
small winning coalitions, while rigged-election autocracies are typified by 
small winning coalitions drawn from relatively large selectorates. 
Figure 1: Governance Institutions 
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The size of a government’s selectorate and winning coalition, and the ratio 
of the two, crucially influence whether leaders survive in office for a long or 
short time, even when they do not face formal term limits.2 The size of the 
coalition also shapes whether leaders disproportionately spend resources on 
private goods that benefit only a few or on public goods that benefit everyone 
in society. How easy or hard it is for a leader to survive in office is shown in 
the selectorate theory to depend on the ratio of the winning coalition’s size to 
the selectorate’s size.  
The smaller the coalition relative to the selectorate, the larger the share of 
government revenue that is controlled at the incumbent leader’s discretion 
rather than being under the control of the members of the winning coalition or 
the society in general. When a leader relies on a small coalition drawn from a 
relatively large selectorate, he or she has substantial discretionary authority and 
a concomitantly easy time surviving in office. Such leaders are relatively un-
constrained in their spending and so may freely engage in kleptocracy, in put-
ting money aside to thwart threats to their incumbency, or to experiment with 
pet policy projects. Conversely, when the coalition is a large percentage of the 
selectorate and the coalition itself is large then leaders must spend nearly all the 
government’s revenue on satisfying the policy demands of their core constitu-
ents; that is, their coalition. Yet, because the benefits they provide are primarily 
public goods that everyone enjoys, whether in the coalition or not, coalition 
membership is not nearly as valuable as it is in a small coalition setting. Thus, 
members are more easily tempted away by rival politicians, leading to weak 
political loyalty. It is this weak loyalty among supporters that compels the 
incumbent in a large coalition, large selectorate system to spend nearly all of 
the revenue on keeping the coalition as happy as possible. As a result, the in-
cumbent has only a small discretionary pot of resources – if any at all – with 
which to salvage incumbency when faced with a threat such as arises during re-
election campaigns or in the run-up to a vote of no-confidence.  
Perhaps perversely, large coalition leaders must produce effective policy 
and yet are easily turned out of office and small coalition leaders find it gener-
ally in their self-interest to produce bad or ineffective policies and yet retain 
office for a long time, especially if they survive the first year or so in office. 
During that initial period in power they face serious challenges while they work 
to establish their credibility as individuals who can deliver wealth to their cro-
nies. This creates an incentive even for autocrats to emulate the behavior of 
democrats during the early part of their time in office. Only after the first year 
or so during which they consolidate their hold on power, autocrats are “liber-
ated” to show their true colors. That is, the likelihood of being ousted from 
power for non-democrats is higher in the first couple of years than it is for 
democrats; later the hazard of deposition is reversed. Autocrats who survive the 
                                                             
2  The existence and impact of term limits is also influenced by the size of a polity’s winning 
coalition and selectorate. 
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first two years are considerably less likely to be deposed after that than are 
democrats. This reversal in survival fortunes is important when we consider 
shifts in the pattern of governance across time in the Congo or elsewhere. 
When leaders can freely choose or change governing institutions, they al-
ways prefer to make the winning coalition as small as is feasible and the selec-
torate as large as is feasible. Of course, they are rarely truly unencumbered in 
such crucial decisions. More often, institutions change when the leadership 
faces or anticipates a credible threat of a coup from coalition members or a 
threat of rebellion or revolution from the general populace. Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith (2007) extend the selectorate theory to assess the conditions under 
which leaders facing such pressures elect to diminish or expand their coalition 
of supporters. They show that leaders only expand the coalition if they cannot 
muster the economic resources necessary to fight off or buy off the threat. They 
also show that when leaders possess substantial natural resources that can be 
extracted with minimal increases to taxation, then they are especially likely to 
contract their coalition when faced with threats or when circumstances other-
wise permit. As we will see, that is exactly what Leopold chose to do in the 
Congo and what his much later successor, Mobutu Sese Seko, did as well. 
As intimated above, a key feature of the selectorate theory is its logical and 
empirical demonstration that leaders who rely on small coalitions retain power 
primarily by providing private, personal rewards to their winning coalition 
members, while leaders in large winning-coalition systems tend to maintain 
their hold on power by providing broad public goods, such as personal free-
doms, effective economic policies and national security. When the coalition is 
small, as was true in the Congo Free State and in Zaire, membership involves 
valuable personal benefits. If the small coalition is drawn from a large pool of 
selectors, then a would-be defector to a rival politician incurs a high risk of 
losing those valued rewards. Naturally, the combination of significant personal 
benefits and the risk of their loss induce fierce loyalty to the leader who pro-
vides the rewards and who demands support in exchange for them. 
In contrast to the special-privileges focus of small coalition systems, per-
sonal rewards to members of large coalitions, such as those typical of modern-
day Belgium and relatively true of Leopold’s constitutional monarchy in the 
late 19th century, are swamped by the greater value of public goods that every-
one enjoys through the public policy choices of the leadership. Because the 
coalition is inherently a relatively large proportion of the selectorate, the risk of 
losing private benefits by being excluded from future winning coalitions is 
relatively small. As a consequence, leaders who rely on large coalitions tend to 
provide successful public policies and enjoy relatively short tenure in office. 
Because the loyalty of coalition members to the incumbent leader is greatest 
when the coalition is small and the selectorate is large and weakest when both 
are large, it is easier for autocrats to survive in office in the face of failed na-
tional policies than it is for effective democratically-elected officials.  
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It should be evident from this summary of the selectorate theory that it im-
plies principles about how leaders who want to retain power will govern in 
different political contexts. In more democratic political settings, survival de-
pends on successful policy. In a small coalition setting, expenditures on public 
welfare that come specifically at the expense of private rewards to coalition 
members diminish the incumbent’s survival prospects. Therefore, a prudent 
autocrat or monarch makes sure to pay off coalition members at a level that is 
sufficient to keep them from believing they will be better off defecting to a 
rival. Fortunately for the incumbent, that does not require spending close to the 
entire available budget on the coalition since its members understand that by 
defecting they are putting at risk the valued rewards they currently are receiv-
ing.  
Satisfying the coalition’s appetite for private rewards does not preclude the 
incumbent from doing good works if he or she happens to be civic minded. 
Rather than stealing from the state, the incumbent can use discretionary re-
sources to do good works. The trouble is first that not many autocrats seem to 
be civic minded, although examples such as Lee Kwan Yew or Deng Xiaoping 
certainly show that such people exist, and second that even among the few who 
are, most have relatively bad ideas about how to advance the public welfare. 
Leaders such as Mao Zedong or Fidel Castro seem to have been genuinely 
interested in improving the lot of the poor, but programs like the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution inflicted huge hardships that nearly bank-
rupted China, just as Castro’s policies have resulted in a significant diminution 
in per capita caloric consumption from the level attained during Fulgencio 
Batista’s time in power. Most autocrats, like the late Ferdinand Marcos and 
Mobutu Sese Seko, or current leaders such as North Korea’s Kim Jong-il, seem 
to lack a sense of civic virtue. They just seem to loot the state for personal gain. 
This makes reliance on the hope of civic mindedness seem risky indeed.  
Democratic governance, by comparison, imparts relatively few private re-
wards to coalition members and little personal control over national budgets to 
the incumbent leader compared to what is available in small coalition regimes. 
Because large coalitions induce leaders to spend primarily on public goods, if 
they want to be sustained in power they must act as if they are civic minded. 
Whether they are in fact or not cannot easily be discerned and probably does 
not matter. Whether out of a craving for power or out of civic virtue, such 
leaders must produce effective policies or face a high risk of ouster.  
This brief outline of implications of the selectorate theory suggests the fol-
lowing hypotheses regarding the Congo and Belgium under Leopold and the 
Congo/Zaire and Belgium in more recent times: 
1) Although Belgian governance even in 1885 relied on a fairly large 
winning coalition by the standards of the day, Leopold should have 
been expected to opt for a small coalition government for the Congo 
Free State. 
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2) Although the Congo’s independence was secured behind a fairly 
democratic movement led by Patrice Lumumba, its governance as an 
independent country should have been expected to devolve after a 
couple of years into a small coalition regime because when faced with 
threats to power, its leaders could rely largely on sources of revenue – 
especially copper and foreign aid – that did not require increased 
taxation on labor. 
3) Because Leopold inherited a constitutional monarchy that faced no 
significant external threat to national security during his reign, he did 
not have the opportunity to diminish the winning coalition and so 
should have supported effective public policies in Belgium that were 
oriented toward satisfying that country’s large coalition. 
4) Because Leopold and Mobutu both governed the Congo with a small 
coalition, they should have produced similarly corrupt and kleptocratic 
regimes with little attentiveness to the general welfare of their 
respective subjects. 
With these hypotheses in mind, I turn now to a brief examination of the 
Congo’s and Belgium’s history as a means to probe the expectations that fol-
low from the selectorate theory.  
3. Leopold, Belgium and the Congo Free State 
When Leopold II succeeded to the Belgian throne, Belgium was already a 
constitutional monarchy. Still, the king had substantial authority, considerably 
more than in most constitutional monarchies. His father, Leopold I, had skill-
fully maneuvered within constitutional constraints. As Margot Lyon notes, he 
accomplished this, “By appointing and dismissing ministers, indefinitely delay-
ing his signature to bills he disliked, and dissolving the Chambers when he 
thought fit, he gradually came to possess more power than the drafters of the 
constitution had envisaged. Through his position as commander-in-chief of 
land and sea forces Leopold I became his own Minister for War.” (Lyon 1971: 
46) Leopold II was equally skillful in using his constitutional authority. Twice, 
for instance, he successfully removed legitimate governing cabinets because he 
disapproved of their policies (Emerson 1979: 129). Thus, despite the con-
straints imposed by the constitutional monarchy, Leopold established that the 
cabinet truly served at his pleasure rather than the other way around. He was an 
activist constitutional monarch who was not shy about using power. He also 
was quite outspoken about his regret at having his hands tied by the constitu-
tional structure he inherited. 
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3.1 Leopold’s Rule in Belgium 
King Leopold II, and the governments over which he presided, depended ini-
tially on a fairly large selectorate for its day, though the franchise was still 
greatly limited, consisting of 137,000 out of a population of nearly six million 
(Lyon 1971: 54). Figure 2 compares the degree of democracy in Belgium to 
that in the rest of Europe from Belgium’s acquisition of independence in 1830 
through to the end of Leopold’s reign. The figure plots Polity IV’s widely 
utilized 21 point scale of democracy minus autocracy.3 For ease of presentation 
and interpretation, I have rescaled the Polity values so that they fall between 
100 – the most liberal democratic regimes – and 0 the most autocratic regimes.  
Figure 2: Coalition Size/Democracy: Europe and Leopold II’s Belgium  
(1830-1909) 
 
 
Figure 2 makes clear that Leopold II inherited a governance structure that 
was unusually democratic for its time. Before about 1850 and after about 1855, 
Belgium was clearly more democratic than the average European state. Al-
though Europe’s democratic inclination grows steadily during the years de-
picted in the figure, it lags far behind Belgium for most of Leopold’s reign, 
closing in on it only in his last few years. By the Polity indicator, Leopold did 
not expand Belgian democracy but he did sustain it. 
                                                             
3  Polity IV offers information on regime and authority characteristics for all states and runs 
currently from the years 1800 to 2004. 
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If the selectorate perspective is correct, Belgium’s Leopold should have 
promoted effective public policy in that country regardless of his personal 
predilection. Indeed, recognizing the constraining political reality of his cir-
cumstance as a constitutional monarch, Leopold helped promote the adoption 
of universal adult male suffrage in free, competitive elections, thereby greatly 
expanding the selectorate as well as the winning coalition size. This suggests 
an emphasis on – if not a personal taste for – public goods in his domestic 
Belgian context. In fact, by general account, Leopold II, though regretful that 
he did not have the authority of an absolute monarch, was an excellent leader 
of Belgium (Lyon 1971; Emerson 1979; Langer 1980). Early in his reign he 
declared: 
The new administration will exercise the utmost economy in the use of gov-
ernmental funds, at the same time taking great care not to disrupt the function-
ing of established public services. It will study the best way to make use of 
our increasing financial resources; it will extend public works programmes but 
at the same time will seek means to reduce taxes on basic food stuffs (quoted 
in Emerson 1979: 123-124). 
Leopold was true to his word. Belgium experienced remarkable economic 
growth and rapid industrialization during his monarchy. Fueled by a free-trade 
economy, imports and exports expanded at a remarkable clip and coal produc-
tion was almost equal to that of the much larger French Republic. Although 
Belgium was already on an impressive growth trajectory before Leopold as-
cended to the thrown, a statistical examination of the marginal impact of his 
reign on growth in, for instance, Belgian energy consumption – a good indica-
tor of economic activity – shows that he had a significant impact in strengthen-
ing the growth trend.4  
Despite Leopold’s effective policies, Belgium proved to be particularly vul-
nerable to a downturn in the business cycle, which began to have severe effects 
in 1873. Working conditions, especially for urban workers, were abysmal even 
by the standards of the day. Already in 1866 Leopold had declared his intention 
to improve the lot of the working class. International threats to Belgian security 
(first the Seven Weeks War of 1866 and then the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-
71) deflected attention from domestic social issues, but with the resolution of 
the Franco-Prussian War and the global economic downturn, attention was 
returned to the domestic plight of workers. In 1873, Belgian workers were 
given the right to strike and other pro-labor reforms were instituted (Emerson 
1979: 131). These reforms were progressive for their day and represented a 
dramatic change over Belgian policy before Leopold’s ascent to the crown.  
                                                             
4  A regression analysis of the logarithm of commercial fuel consumption in Belgium over 
time, based on the Correlates of War Project’s energy consumption variable, while control-
ling for the years of Leopold’s reign with a dummy variable coded as 1 when he was king 
and as 0 in all other years (1830 – 1991) indicates: Log(Energy Consumption) = -69.31 + 
0.04 Year + 50.29 Leopold – 0.02 (Leopold*Year); test that Leopold + (Leopold*Year) > 0 
is significant with p < .00001, F = 158.90. 
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The impetus for reform did not end. In 1886 – while already engaging in 
atrocities within his Congo fiefdom – Leopold strongly supported a huge public 
works program that included road and railway construction designed to allevi-
ate unemployment, promote urbanization and enhance commercialism. In 
1889, again with the King’s support, legislation was passed to protect women 
and children. The law of 1889 protected children by forbidding their employ-
ment until they turned twelve and then limited their work day to twelve hours 
(Emerson 1979: 133). By modern standards this may seem modest, but in the 
context of the times it was a progressive move. 
Leopold was instrumental in promoting numerous additional reforms within 
Belgium, including the introduction of widespread improvements in education, 
including compulsory primary education, the introduction of proportional rep-
resentation voting, the signing of treaties with Britain, Prussia and France guar-
anteeing Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, and efforts to 
improve Belgian defenses against threats to Belgian neutrality and sovereignty 
from France and Germany. As Emerson, in a study generally (and under-
standably) hostile to Leopold II, observes, “Throughout his life the king’s 
attitude to social questions changed little: he favoured the alleviation of misery 
in a spirit of benevolent paternalism . . .” (131). However monstrous he was in 
his leadership of the Congo, a place where he showed no hint of benevolence 
and where he fostered unspeakable misery, it is evident that he worked hard as 
king to promote the delivery of public goods to the mass of the Belgian popula-
tion. He did so in Belgium, but not in the Congo, before and during his per-
sonal reign over the Congo Free State. 
3.2 Leopold’s Rule in the Congo 
Leopold rose to the throne at a time that many states in Europe were building 
empires on the backs of colonial labor. He aspired to be a member of that club. 
After several aborted efforts to become a colonial power in various parts of the 
world, he finally succeeded in acquiring vast tracks of land in Africa’s interior. 
Unlike Britain’s, France’s, Spain’s or others’ colonies, however, the Congo 
Free State was not acquired by a colonizing sovereign state, but rather as Leo-
pold’s personal property. In ruling Belgium, he depended on the largesse of a 
popularly elected government; he depended, in other words, on a large winning 
coalition. The Belgian leadership included not only Leopold, but the prime 
minister and cabinet whose choice depended on popular support within a selec-
torate that had been greatly enlarged by Leopold. In ruling the Congo, Leopold 
relied only on himself and the (quite literally) hired guns that went to the 
Congo in support of his objectives. The political system he erected in the 
Congo relied on a miniscule winning coalition. Of course, this is just the form 
of government an unencumbered leader would like to choose. The selectorate 
model suggests that in the Congo Leopold would turn his efforts to generating 
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private goods for his backers and opportunities for kleptocracy for himself. He 
did exactly that. 
As liberal, progressive a reformer as Leopold was in the Belgian context, he 
was a monstrously cruel and greedy leader of the Congo. There, through his 
surrogates (Leopold himself never set foot in the Congo), Leopold ruled for the 
purpose of making himself and his key backers rich. Slave labor extracted the 
rubber that fueled Leopold’s kleptocracy and the corrupt gains of his overseers. 
Those Congolese who failed to meet their quotas were beaten, maimed and 
often killed. As many as ten million may have been killed so that Leopold and 
his cronies could become rich (Hochschild 1999; Forbath 1977; Emerson 1971; 
Conrad 1903).  
At first, Leopold used his authority over the Congo to exploit it for ivory. 
Later, as demand for rubber grew, the Congo became a major source of rubber 
throughout the world. Extracting the rubber was a tedious, labor-intensive 
undertaking. To insure that demand was met, Leopold’s government included 
the creation of the notorious Force Publique. This “police” force was paid a 
low salary. The income of its members depended heavily on commissions paid 
in exchange for delivering wealth to the king. Leopold imposed rubber quotas 
and the Force Publique saw to it that they were fulfilled. Unrestricted by any 
law governing their conduct and provided with a huge financial incentive 
through the commission system, the “police” used whatever means they saw fit 
to meet the quotas.  
These means included torture, maiming (chopping off right hands) and mass 
murder. Hands were cut off as proof of how many allegedly anti-government 
rebels were killed. The “rebels” were more often than not just locals who re-
sisted their exploitation as forced, slave labor. The “police” were rewarded for 
killing anti-government rebels and so quickly took to indiscriminate mutilation 
as a means to boost their hand count and, thereby, their fees. An eyewitness 
account by a Danish missionary, reports: 
If the rubber does not reach the full amount required the sentries attack the na-
tives. They kill some and bring the hands to the Commissioner. That was 
about the time I saw the native killed before my own eyes. The soldier said, 
‘Don’t take this to heart so much. They kill us if we don’t bring the rubber. 
The Commissioner has promised us if we have plenty of hands he will shorten 
our service.’ These were often smoked to preserve them until they could be 
shown to the European officer (Forbath 1977). 
An American eyewitness noted:  
Imagine them returning from fighting rebels; see on the bow of the canoe is a 
pole and a bundle of something on it. These are the hands of sixteen warriors 
they have slain. ‘Warriors?’ Don’t you see among them the hands of little 
children and girls? I have seen them. I have seen where the trophy has been 
cut off, while the poor heart beat strongly enough to shoot the blood from the 
cut arteries at a distance of fully four feet (Forbath 1977). 
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One prominent officer in the Force Publique, Captain Léon Rom, was re-
ported to have decorated the outer-perimeter of the flower-bed in front of his 
house with more than twenty human heads.  
Leopold and his supporters in the Force Publique grew fabulously wealthy 
from their ill-gotten gains from the Congo Free State. Virtually nothing was 
invested in improving conditions in that hapless land. Roads were built only 
where they facilitated moving rubber to market. Laws protecting women and 
children or worker rights to strike were unheard of in the Congo Free State, 
even as Leopold promoted just such legislation in Belgium. Much as Leopold 
worried about protecting the security of his Belgian subjects, he worked to 
undermine the security of his Congolese subjects. Virtually the only items 
exported to the Congo Free State were weapons for the Force Publique, while 
vast riches were imported to Belgium. Indeed, it was this extraordinary imbal-
ance in trade that eventually led to the discovery by outsiders, especially Ed-
mund Morel, that Leopold was growing rich on the use of slave labor. Eventu-
ally, in 1908 the evidence of atrocities reached such a level that they could no 
longer be denied and Leopold, with great reluctance, was forced to cede his 
control to the Belgian government. They certainly did not rule well by contem-
porary standards, but compared to Leopold’s rule, the Belgians were a signifi-
cant improvement. 
Leopold’s circumstance was close to unique. Britain and France had vast 
African and global colonial empires. Portugal and Germany also participated in 
the colonization of African lands. These cases, however, primarily involved 
European governments imposing themselves on African people; they did not 
involve a single individual, like Leopold, who governed at his personal discre-
tion. The government structures back home acted as at least a modest constraint 
on what European colonists could and did do; not so for Leopold. His conduct 
in his personal fiefdom in the Congo left him impervious to outside pressures 
for decades. Finally, although European atrocities were commonplace in much 
of Africa, they did not rise to the level of such atrocities committed on Leo-
pold’s behalf in the Congo. He had the freedom to choose how to govern un-
constrained by a parliament at home and he chose to do exactly what the selec-
torate theory suggests any unencumbered leader will do: exploit the wealth of 
the people and the place almost completely without limit. 
But then Leopold was a fine leader in Belgium, also following the expecta-
tions of the selectorate theory, in this case for an incumbent encumbered by a 
relatively large coalition. This compels us to ask: Who was the real Leopold? 
Was he the civic-minded king of Belgium or the murderous ruler of the Congo 
Free State? We must conclude that the latter comes closest to the mark. In 
Belgium, as we have noted, Leopold operated under the institutional constraint 
of a large winning coalition. He did not select such a system – he inherited it – 
and he acted in accordance with the incentives created by such an institutional 
framework. In the Congo, Leopold was free to choose whatever institutional 
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arrangements he wanted. No precedent or inherited institutions precluded his 
choosing a system that induced incentives to rule in the interest of public wel-
fare. Finding himself unconstrained, he chose to focus on providing private 
goods for a small coalition and vast opportunities for kleptocracy for himself. 
In each case his actions were consistent with the institutional incentives he 
faced and, therefore his behavior was radically different in Belgium from what 
it was in the Congo. 
Leopold’s pattern of behavior both in the Congo and in Belgium were con-
sistent with the expectations deduced from the selectorate theory. But perhaps 
this compliance with the expectations derived from the game theoretic logic of 
the selectorate theory is just coincidence. To probe whether that is the case, I 
turn now to an investigation of the Congo in a more contemporary setting. 
4. Zaire/the Congo: the Mobutu Years 
In June 1960 Patrice Lumumba was elected as the Congo’s first freely chosen 
prime minister. He was murdered on January 17, 1961, just half a year later. 
Lumumba ran into difficulty with western democracies because of the policies 
he adopted. He spoke out vehemently against the years of Belgian rule over the 
Congo. In a speech during Congo’s independence celebration less than a week 
after his election as Prime Minister, Lumumba announced, “Nous ne sommes 
plus vos singes [We are no longer your monkeys]” (Meredith 2005: 102). In an 
effort to remove Belgian troops and diplomats from the Congo and to defeat 
the secessionist movement in Katanga Province led by Moise Tchombe he 
sought Soviet military assistance. The massive bulk of evidence today points to 
US and Belgian complicity in Lumumba’s murder. Later the United States 
would become closely associated with the Congo’s (i.e., Zaire’s) Mobutu Sese 
Seko who, unlike Lumumba, was neither democratic nor pro-Soviet. 
We will never know whether Lumumba was a true democrat or was emulat-
ing democratic practices to shore up his hold on power as is the wont of many 
would-be dictators early during their tenure in office. If the former was the 
case, it is truly tragic for the people of the Congo that he did not live. If the 
latter was the case, then probably he would have been no different from so 
many other leaders who at independence were freely elected only to turn their 
countries into petty, personalist dictatorships. We cannot evaluate how Lu-
mumba would have governed. We can, however, evaluate the record of Mobutu 
Sese Seko.  
Mobutu assumed power in 1965 and quickly eliminated competitive elec-
tions and most of his political opponents. He received massive foreign eco-
nomic assistance, especially from the United States and Belgium, and appar-
ently stole so much of it that the word “kleptocracy” was coined to describe his 
form of rule. Figure 3 compares the average Polity score for African countries 
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(excluding the Arab states and Israel) to Zaire’s.5 As poor as Africa’s perform-
ance has been on governance, Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo has 
been worse. And how have these people of the former Belgian Congo done 
since independence? Have they enjoyed a steadily growing quality of life based 
on the massive foreign aid and natural resource wealth of their country? As 
with governance, so too with quality of life, things have not gone well for the 
Congolese. 
Figure 3: Democracy/Coalition Size in Zaire/Congo and in Africa 
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Figures 4 and 5 provide two diverse indicators of quality of life, each com-
paring the former Belgian Congo’s record to the average for its fellow-African 
states. In figure 4, we see the World Bank’s data on per capita income. In re-
cent years parts of Africa have begun to enjoy significant real growth and with 
it rising hopes of alleviating poverty. Still, Africa remains a deeply impover-
ished continent. And yet, the former Belgian Congo, despite – or perhaps be-
cause of – its enormous natural wealth and massive foreign aid receipts, espe-
cially during the cold war, persists in being well below average even for Africa 
on this crucial indicator. In Africa, only former Portuguese colonies seem to do 
as badly or worse. The people of the Congo were poor under Leopold even as 
he grew rich on the back of their labor and the people under Mobutu were 
                                                             
5  More specifically, Africa is defined as all countries with a Polity country code greater than 
399 and less than 630. 
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likewise poor even as he grew rich. Not only do contemporary Congolese have 
poverty in common with their brethren of a century or more ago. They have 
also shared the life of oppression suffered under Leopold. Here again, they 
generally fare much worse that other African countries whose colonial heritage 
is not Belgian. 
Figure 4: African and Congo/Zaire per Capita Income 
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Leopold, as noted earlier, is estimated to be responsible for the murder of 
millions of people, Mobutu of hundreds of thousands. Leopold surely ranks 
near the top of anyone’s list of mass murderers. Rudolph Rummel’s assessment 
of the worst genocides in the twentieth century ranks Mobutu 21st out of the 
hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of country leaders during that century (Sca-
ruffi 2005). Among post-World War II national leaders, he ranks 15th for his 
murderous ways, and among post-World War II African leaders, he ranks sixth. 
As is clear from figure 5, Mobutu not only murdered many of his fellow Con-
golese, but he out-tortured most of Africa. Despite the African continent’s poor 
record on human rights, the Congo under Mobutu, as the Congo under Leo-
pold, managed respectively to be a much worse place to live than the rest of 
post-independence Africa or colonial Africa. 
What are we to infer? The Congo was a particularly harsh place to be born 
in during the colonial era. It remained a particularly harsh place to be born in 
under the thirty-two year reign of Mobutu. He, like Leopold, ran a small coali-
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tion, rent-seeking regime. Leopold managed to hold on to power in the Congo 
for 23 years, giving up power under enormous international pressure only after 
it became known that he was suffering from a terminal illness; that is, when it 
was known he could no longer be relied upon to deliver private rewards to his 
cronies. Mobutu also fell from power when it became known that he had a 
terminal illness that meant he could no longer be relied upon by the military to 
take care of them. One’s reign of terror might be attributed to racism, but the 
others cannot be. Nor can colonialism and racism alone be the general explana-
tion of differences in governance. After all, most of the rest of Africa was also 
subjected to colonial and presumptively racist rule. Most of the rest of Africa 
has done poorly and that may be why. But it has done better than the 
Congo/Zaire on numerous indicators of quality of life and on numerous indica-
tors of oppression.  
Figure 5: Torture in Africa and in Zaire: Amnesty International’s Assessment 
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The Congo had exactly the mix of resources that made it an especially at-
tractive place for particularly oppressive autocratic governance. It possessed 
huge resources that made ruling extremely valuable and that made buying off 
threats straightforward. In each case, its leaders have followed the expectations 
of the selectorate theory as laid out in the four hypotheses presented earlier. 
And in each case, we have been able to account for the particularly miserable 
record without appealing to such human shortcomings as racism and imperial-
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ism. Whatever they may add to the account, we have seen that the structure of 
governing institutions can go a long way to explain a good or bad record of 
performance in a manner consistent with the deductive logic of the selectorate 
theory, a theory that assumes all leaders want the same thing: to maximize their 
survival in office and, subject to achieving that goal, to maximize their discre-
tionary control over national resources. Mobutu and Leopold certainly achieved 
both of those goals in the Congo. Leopold was much more limited in his ability 
to control the Belgian economy and so he opted for public-spirited policies that 
ensured his political survival in that context as well. 
5. Conclusions 
The institutions of coalition size and selectorate, mediated through the loyalty 
norm defined by the ratio of the two, consistently shape incentives for good or 
bad governance. The incentives created by a large winning coalition foster 
what most people think of as good government. A small winning coalition, 
especially combined with a large selectorate, helps foster governance that 
seems indifferent to producing income for its citizens within a secure environ-
ment. Instead, such governments promote corruption, black marketeering and 
cronyism. We have seen this in the record of both the Congo Free State under 
Leopold II and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko. When governance conditions 
encourage good behavior, even bad people – and surely Leopold was a bad 
person – may govern well as was true for Belgium during the approximately 
forty year reign of Leopold II. The lesson for those who wish to see conditions 
improve in Africa is clear. Improve African governance before solving other 
problems, and Africans will solve their own problems skillfully and effectively.  
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